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INTRODUCTION

When the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in
1974, patterned on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ' Rule 34
discovery simply involved the exchange of paper documentation between
the parties to the litigation.2 By 2008, however, it was estimated that 210

. Barry C. Klickstein is a senior trial partner at the law firm of Duane Morris
LLP in Boston
where he is a member of the firm's e-discovery task force. He is a cum laude graduate of the
University of Massachusetts, and a cum laude graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
• Katherine Young Fergus is a senior trial associate at the law firm of Duane
Morris LLP in
Boston. She is a graduate of Bowdoin College, and a magna cum laude graduate of Suffolk
University Law School.
See Giacobbe v. First Coolidge Corp., 325 N.E.2d 922, 926 (Mass. 1975) ("The new
Massachusetts rules of civil and appellate procedure which took effect on July 1, 1974, were
patterned on the time-tested rules which had governed these procedures in the Federal courts for
many years.").
2 See MASS. R. Civ. P. 34(a). This rule explains
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the party
making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any
designated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs,
phone-records, and other data compilations from which information can be obtained,
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billion e-mail messages are transmitted daily. 3 With the enormity of that

amount of "non-paper" information stored on hard drives, servers, and
backup tapes came the problem of producing it during civil litigation.4 By

its nature, this electronic or digital information, now known universally in
litigation as electronically-stored information ("ESI"), 5 differs significantly
from conventional paper information.6 Differences include: (1) the sheer
volume of information generated; (2) the dynamic, volatile and/or mutable

nature of that information from simply opening a file or turning on a
computer; (3) the permanent nature of the information; (4) what its
metadata 7 can tell us from a forensic standpoint; and (5) the cost of

translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably
usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which
constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the
possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served.
Id. Although Ray Tomlinson created e-mail in 1971 using the "@" symbol to separate a user's
name from his computer's address, Tim Berners-Lee did not develop the World Wide Web, the
engine through which modern e-mail became a household word, until 1991. See Connected Earth
Internet Timeline, http://www.connected-earth.com/LearningCentre/Historyoftheinternet/Timelin
e/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
3 See Study, The Radicati Group, Inc., "Corporate IT Survey - Messaging and Collaboration,
2008-2009." September 28, 2008.
4 "[T]he frequency with which electronic discovery-related questions arise in state courts is
increasing rapidly, because of the near universal reliance on electronic records both by business
and individuals." Conference of Chief Justices, Policy Statements & Resolutions, Resolution 6
Regarding Approval of the Guidelines for State Trial Courts on Discoverv of ElectronicallyStored Information, available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/resol6DiscoveryOfElectronicallyStored
Information.html.
5 The American Bar Association Standards Relating to Electronic Discovery defines
electronically stored information as "any information created, stored, or best utilized with
computer

technology

of any

type."

AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION,

CIVIL

DISCOVERY

STANDARDS (2004), http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystan
dards.pdf.
6 "[T]here are significant differences in the discovery of conventional paper documents and
electronically stored information in terms of volume, volatility and cost." Conference of Chief
Justices, supra note 4.
7 Metadata is many times defined as "data about data" because it is simply information
embedded in an electronic document that describes when the document was created, what that
document's revision history consists of, and how the document was managed. See Philip J.
Favro, A New FrontierIn Electronic Discovety: Preserving and Maintaining Metadata, 13 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 4 (2007). Metadata is embedded in the document; that is, it is not visible
when the document is printed or when it is converted to an image file. Id. In this article, the
author explains the nature and significance of metadata, including what metadata can disclose
depending on whether the file is a Microsoft Word file, an Adobe PDF file, an Excel File, an Email, or a Word Perfect file. Id. The article also offers practical tips to ensure receipt ofmetadata
in discovery by implementing a timely litigation hold, familiarizing oneself with the local rules,
determining and specifying the form of production early, specifically requesting "electronically
stored information," and clarifying whether the court orders require disclosure of metadata. Id.
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Recognizing these differences, the Civil Rules Advisory
retrieval.'
Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempted to address
the issues raised by the discovery of ESI, an effort that resulted in a
package of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that went
into effect on December 1, 2006. 9
While there has been much attention paid to publicizing and
evaluating the 2006 package of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in the area of electronic discovery, there has been little attention
to the appropriate approach in the state trial courts of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.' 0 Rule 34 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure
does include the obligation to produce documents and things in a non-paper
format, but it does not lay out the precise nature of the obligations or the
Furthermore, there has been no
appropriate method for doing so."
amendment to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
Standing Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil and Appellate
Procedure is simply monitoring the federal approach under the 2006
amendments.' 2 Without the adoption of a formal set of rules by the state
courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the approach to "ediscovery" can seem like the blind leading the blind, a virtual guessing
game. 13 What has been overshadowed by the adoption of and the publicity
surrounding the new Federal e-discovery rules is the attempt by the
Conference of Chief Justices, through an e-discovery task force chaired by
Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall, to provide
useful guidance in this area for state court judges.14 Although this guidance
falls short of actual amendments to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil
Procedure, it does shed some light on an area that to date has caused panic

8 See Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 4 (referring to cost of electronic discovery).
9 See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF
THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 18 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/

CV5-2005.pdf.
10 Texas, however, is an example of a state which has specifically adopted an e-discovery
rule. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4.
1 See MASS. R. Civ. P. 34(a). The rule defines discoverable documents to include "data
compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent
through detection devices into reasonably usable form." Id.
12 See Barbara Rabinowitz, State 's Trial Courts To Otter Guidelines On E-Discovery, SJC s
Marshall Leading National Elfort on Topic, MASSACHUSETTS LAWYERS WEEKLY, Dec. 25,
2006, at 1.
13 The unpredictability of the state court may cause parties to consider removal to the federal
court where there is a set of e-discovery rules already in place. Removal to federal court,
however, carries its own risks because the amendments place clear and unequivocal burdens on
parties and on their counsel.
14 See generally Rabinowitz, supra note 12 (discussing Justice Marshall's role in c-discovery
task force).
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for attorneys and clients alike. This article highlights the Guidelines as one

of a number of sources that may provide guidance in the area of state court
e-discovery issues, and it offers advice in navigating a state court case
involving a significant amount of ESI so as to avoid sanctions.
II.

A.

DISCUSSION

The 2006 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure

Faced with what was inconsistent developing case law in the area
of e-discovery, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure amended the Federal Rules governing discovery in an5

effort to clarify the process of retaining, retrieving, and re-producing ESI.1
While there is some debate on whether these amendments actually provide
the needed clarification, the existence of formal rules does provide some
predictability that had been missing from the relevant case law existing at
the time. 16 Prior to the effective date of the e-discovery amendments to the
Federal Rules, the seminal authority in this area was a series of decisions in
the Zubulake v. UBS Warburg matter pending before the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.1 7 In that litigation, a

former equities trader for the defendant UBS Warburg ("UBS"), Laura
Zubulake ("Ms. Zubulake"), filed an action against UBS for gender
discrimination and illegal retaliation. 8 During the discovery phase of the

15 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(5) and (6); FED. R. Civ. P. 26; FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d); FED. R.
Civ. P. 34(a) and (b); FED. R. Civ. P.37(f); FED. R. Civ. P 45, as amended.
16 See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discoverv Rules, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 52-53 (2007) (debate about whether amendments to Federal Rules
provide needed clarification). Such a debate exists because FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) provides
that ESI "not reasonably accessible" is discoverable only if requesting party can show "good
cause," but provides no working definition of "good cause." See id.
17 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(addressing legal standard for determining cost allocation for producing e-mails contained on
backup tapes); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I1), 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(addressing Zubulake's reporting obligations); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III),
216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (allocating backup tape restoration costs between Zubulake and
UBS); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ordering
sanctions against UBS for violating duty to preserve evidence); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
(Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting plaintiffs motion for sanctions). The
court further ruled ruling that the jury would be given adverse inference instruction with respect
to deleted emails, that UBS pay the costs of any depositions or re-depositions required by its late
production of email, and that UBS reimburse plaintiff for costs of motion. Zubulake V, 229
F.R.D. at 439.
"8 Zubulakel, 217F.R.D. at 311.
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litigation, UBS responded to discovery requests propounded by Ms.
Zubulake by producing just over 350 pages of documents, including 100
pages of e-mails from "key players" within its organization, claiming that
any search and production of additional emails that were stored on back-up
tapes was cost prohibitive and thereby unwarranted.1 9 Ultimately, the court
disagreed with UBS and ordered production of five of UBS' ninety-four
backup tapes. 20 When it came to actual production of the information
stored on these tapes, however, UBS "realized" that several of these backup
Despite UBS's
tapes had been recycled rather than retained.2'
implementation of an early "litigation hold," which included oral
instructions to all employees to retain any relevant information regarding
Ms. Zubulake and the pending litigation, 22 UBS failed to specifically order
that the backup tapes be retained rather than recycled.23 The court found
UBS liable for the destruction of the emails, notwithstanding UBS in-house
counsel's instruction to employees not to destroy them.24 As a sanction, the
court ordered UBS to pay Ms. Zubulake's attorneys' fees and costs
associated with the taking and re-taking of depositions occasioned by UBS'
misconduct, and the court gave the jury an adverse inference instruction
with respect to the emails lost. 25 This instruction led to a $29.3 million jury
verdict in favor of Ms. Zubulake.26 Not only did Zubulake V set the tone
for sanctions, it also set the duty to preserve at the point in time when a
party anticipates litigation.27 The case further demonstrated that a litigation
hold letter was not the panacea to a claim for sanctions against counsel for
Zubulake V places significant
a client's destruction of evidence.28
19 Id. at 312-13 (estimating cost of searching backup tapes at approximately $300,000).
20 Id. at 324 (permitting Zubulake to select five of ninety-four backup tapes from which UBS

to search for responsive documents).
21 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 425.
22 Id. ("UBS's in-house attorneys gave oral instructions in August 2001 -- immediately after
Zubulake filed her EEOC charge -- instructing employees not to destroy or delete material
potentially relevant to Zubulake's claims, and in fact to segregate such material into separate files
for the lawyers' eventual review.").
23 Id. ("This warning pertained to both electronic and hard-copy files, but did not
specifically pertain to so-called 'backup tapes,' maintained by UBS's information technology
personnel.").
24 Id.at 439-40.
25 id.

26 Zubulake V,229 F.R.D. at 440.
27

Id.at 433.

28 See id. ("The litigation hold should be periodically re-issued so that new employees are
aware of it, and so that it is fresh in the minds of all employees."). Further, the Zubulake court set
forth additional steps for counsel seeking to ensure retention of information and to avoid
sanctions:
Second, counsel should communicate directly with the "key players" in the litigation,
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emphasis on counsel's active role in preserving the evidence, even if that
means taking physical possession of backup tapes to ensure that they are
not inadvertently recycled.2 9
When the new package of amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure aimed at discovery of ESI went into effect on December 1,
2006, there was a sigh of relief that echoed through the federal bar.
Previously, many practitioners had been holding their breath every time
they faced the arduous task of appropriately responding to discovery
requests aimed at capturing a large volume of a client's ESI. While by no
means relief to a client facing the expense of e-discovery or relief to an
attorney trying to comprehend the detail, sources, and custodians of his/her
client's ESI, at the very least the amendments were intended to provide
some much-needed predictability with respect to the proper approach to

and treatment of the issues surrounding e-discovery.3 ° In particular, the
amendments codify the duties and obligations of the practitioner in
navigating what were previously murky waters. 3' The amendments include
the factors to be considered with respect to the allocation of cost of
production, the form of production, the advantages of avoiding disputes by
coming to early agreement on the issues, the scope of the duty to preserve,
and the standards for sanctions. 32 The amendments were intended to codify
the burgeoning federal jurisprudence that is largely encapsulated in the

i.e., the people identified in a party's initial disclosure and any subsequent
supplementation thereto. Because these "key players" are the "employees likely to
have relevant information," it is particularly important that the preservation duty be
communicated clearly to them. As with the litigation hold, the key players should be
periodically reminded that the preservation duty is still in place.
Finally, counsel should instruct all employees to produce electronic copies of their
relevant active files. Counsel must also make sure that all backup media which the
party is required to retain is identified and stored in a safe place. In cases involving a
small number of relevant backup tapes, counsel might be advised to take physical
possession of backup tapes. In other cases, it might make sense for relevant backup
tapes to be segregated and placed in storage. Regardless of what particular arrangement
counsel chooses to employ, the point is to separate relevant backup tapes from others.
One of the primary reasons that electronic data is lost is ineffective communication
with information technology personnel. By taking possession of, or otherwise
safeguarding, all potentially relevant backup tapes, counsel eliminates the possibility
that such tapes will be inadvertently recycled.
Id. at 433-34.
29 See id.
30 See Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 8, at 18-19.

31 See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 440 ("When this case began more than two years ago, there
was little guidance from the judiciary, bar associations or the academy as to the governing
standards.").
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(5) and (6); FED. R. Civ. P 26; FED. R. Civ. P 33(d); FED. R.
Civ. P 34(a) and (b); FED. R. CIv. P 37(f); and FED. R. Civ. P. 45, as amended.
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Zubulake decisions.
The waters may have cleared in the federal court, but the absence
of any amendment to the counterpart Massachusetts Rules of Civil
Procedure has left practitioners looking for guidance in their efforts to
properly deal with these issues efficiently, effectively, and appropriately, in
order to provide a modicum of predictability for their clients. The need for
formal, written guidance is particularly appropriate because discovery
disputes are determined in many cases on the fly with no reported, or even
many times written, trial court opinions, let alone any appellate court
decisions upon which to rely. 34 The Supreme Judicial Court has asked its

Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure to monitor the
experience of the federal courts, but there is no indication as yet whether
and if so, when, we may see amendments to the Massachusetts Rules of
Civil Procedure setting forth the standards for electronic discovery.
B.

The Guidelinesfor State Trial Courts RegardingDiscovery of
Electronically-StoredInformation

Recognizing the need for some guidance and uniformity in the area
of electronic discovery in the state courts, the Conference of Chief Justices
("CCJ"), adopted its own set of Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding
Discovery of Electronically-Stored Information in August of 2006
(hereinafter "the Guidelines").35 The Conference officially approved the
Guidelines in Resolution 6 at the 5 8 th Annual Meeting on August 2, 2006,
after a two-year process through which the highest judicial officers of each
state presented their opinions and insight.36 Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court Chief Justice Margaret Marshall was the chair of the task
force that drafted the Guidelines, and the Guidelines have been linked to
the Massachusetts Trial Court Law Libraries website. 3' Accordingly, while
non-binding, the pedigree of the Guidelines suggests that their use carries
more weight than simply persuasive authority in the area of e-discovery in

33 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
34 See Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 4 ("[D]iscovery disputes are rarely the

subject of appellate review.").
35 RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE

(2006),
http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf.
36 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at ix.
37 See http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/e-discovery.html. The Guidelines may also be found on
under the "Important Documents" section of the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly website,
www.masslawyersweekly.com.
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the state courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.3 8
1.

The 10,000 Foot View

The Guidelines are by their own terms non-binding and in many
respects simply echo the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; nonetheless, the Guidelines are critical to a civil litigator's
arsenal in the state court. By their own terms, the Guidelines are "intended
to help reduce . ..uncertainty in state court litigation by assisting trial
judges faced by a dispute over e-discovery in identifying the issues and
determining the decision-making factors to be applied."39
An
understanding of what tools the trial court judges have available to them to
make decisions in this area will assist practitioners in preparing appropriate
requests for ESI, responding to requests for ESI, and conducting ediscovery motion practice.
First, the Guidelines acknowledge the simple fact that "[m]ost
documents today are in digital form" making it impossible to ignore the
realities of electronic discovery, particularly where the "volume, number of
locations, and data volatility of electronic documents are significantly
,40
greater than those of conventional documents."
Walking through an
example of the volume of data created by a relatively small company in a
single day, and what it would cost to restore that data, the Guidelines
emphasize the need to reign in what had been historically an open-door
discovery approach by the trial court. 4' Tracing the experience of the
federal courts, the Guidelines observe that the restoration of 93 backup
tapes "was estimated to cost $6.2 million before attorney review of the
resulting files for relevance or privilege objections., 42 Thus, there is a real
need for "properly managed" electronic discovery to allow the parties to
realize the advantages of electronic discovery by permitting them to
"organize, identify and even authenticate documents in a fraction of the
time and at a fraction of the cost of copying and transport" of conventional
document productions.43
Second, the Guidelines translate some of the computer jargon that
has befuddled many in their efforts to understand the ins and outs of

38 See Rabinowitz, supra note 12, at I (according to Justice Marshall, Massachusetts trial
court chiefjustices have received and "welcomed" copies of the Guidelines).
39 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at vii.

40 Id.at v.
41 See id. at v.
42

Id.

41 Id. at

vi.
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electronic discovery.44 For example, the Guidelines contain a good
working definition of "metadata," a primer for understanding the volume of
documents contained on a single CD-ROM, the functional equivalents in
type-written pages of a terabyte and megabyte, and a description of the
nature of the volatility and mutability of ESI which arises from the fact45 that
it can be altered simply by turning a computer on or by opening a file.
Third, the Guidelines share the cornerstone philosophy that is
codified in Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,and is the
common thread running throughout the amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: issues of e-discovery must be raised candidly with
opposing counsel early, often, and, if at all possible, should be resolved by
agreement without resorting to court intervention.4 6 This approach is based
on the belief that many of the problems with respect to ESI discovery can
be avoided if counsel are knowledgeable about their client's ESI and if they
come to a realistic agreement with their adversaries on the exchange of that
information.47 Not only do the Rules require this background knowledge
and encourage agreement between counsel, but the client's ability to
Such
navigate any litigation involving e-discovery depends on it.
agreements ensure that counsel conduct practical and realistic conferences
with their clients. 48 These agreements may also have the additional
advantage of promoting early resolution of cases, particularly given the
potential magnitude of the cost of e-discovery even for third parties.49

44 See VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at v-vi.
45 Id. at v-vi. "Computer systems automatically recycle and reuse memory space, overwrite

backups, change file locations, and otherwise maintain themselves automatically with the effect
of altering or destroying computer data without any human intent, intervention, or even
knowledge." Id. at v.
46 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). The Rule requires the parties to discuss any issues relative to the
preservation of discoverable information and develop a proposed discovery plan detailing any
issues relative to the disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the
form of production "as soon as practicable and in any event at least 21 days before" the Rule
16(b) scheduling conference. Id.
47 See VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 1-4.
48 But see Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, LLP, No. 03 Civ. 5560
(RMB) (HBP), 2006 WL 1520227, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006) (explaining litigation hold
letters should not contain prejudicial information or analysis of evidence, claims or defenses
because unclear whether such letters subject to attorney/client privilege). Moreover, these letters
and communications should be distributed beyond simply in-house counsel, and should find their
way to IT personnel, data custodians, key witnesses and others who are likely to possess or
control relevant data. See Zubulake V,229 F.R.D. 422, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
49 See In re Fannie May Securities Litigation, 552 F.3d 814, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming
Order that requires non-party to spend $6 million, 9% of its total annual budget to comply with ediscovery subpoena).
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The Detailed Guidelines

Guideline 1 contains a comprehensive definition of "[e]lectronically-stored information" which includes "both on-screen information and
system data and metadata that may not be readily viewable." 50 Guideline 1
also defines "[a]ccessible information" based on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) as ESI that is "readily retrievable in the ordinary
course of business without undue cost and burden." 5' While not further
defining what constitutes "undue cost and burden," the Comment cites the
Zubulake III decision as authority and recognizes that "examples of
information that may not be reasonably accessible in all instances include
data stored on back-up tapes or legacy systems; material that has been
deleted; and residual data." 52 This explanation set forth in the Comment
lends support to the argument that so long as a party has acted pursuant to
its existing document storage and retention policies, the court may spare
that party the obligation of spending undue resources to recover backup
tapes holding data for the period prior to the time litigation was
"probable. 5 3
Guideline 2 tracks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(f),
advising the judge "when appropriate" to encourage counsel to be
conversant with the "operation of the party's relevant information54
management systems, including how information is stored and retrieved."
It further cautions that a party seeking production of ESI should
communicate that fact to opposing counsel "as soon as possible," along
with a "clear[] identiflication]" of the "categories or types of information to
be sought., 55 The Comment to the Guideline further underscores the idea
that where counsel has informed herself about her client's "data storage and
management systems and policies at the earliest stages of litigation," that
will "facilitate the smooth operation of the discovery process. ' 56 The
Comment also states that "[v]oluntary resolution of issues involving
electronically-stored information by counsel for the parties should be
encouraged., 57 The Comment further indicates that "the manner in which
50 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 1.
51 id.
52 id.
53 See id. at 5 (suggesting trial court consider whether responding party deleted information
"after litigation was commenced or after the responding party was aware that litigation was
probable").
" Id. at 1.
55 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 1.
56 Id.at 2.

57 Id..
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this encouragement should be given will, of necessity, depend on the
procedures and practices of a particular jurisdiction and the needs of the
case before the court," which suggests that the party and/or its counsel who
is unwilling to compromise risks an adverse discovery order from the court.
Guideline 3 tasks the trial judge with encouraging counsel to meet
and confer to voluntarily agree on the ESI to be disclosed, the manner of
disclosure, and an appropriate schedule for disclosure.58 In the event the
parties cannot reach agreement, Guideline 3 provides that the Court direct
the exchange of information "that will enable the discovery process to
move forward expeditiously" and ensure that the list of information subject
to discovery is "tailored to the case at issue., 59 The Guideline includes a
list of eight items a judge should consider in entering an order for the
"exchange of the basic informational foundation that will assist in tailoring
e-discovery requests and moving the discovery process forward., 60 These

" Id.at 2-3.
59 Id.
60 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 2-3. Among the items ajudge should consider are:
(1)a list of the person(s) most knowledgeable about the relevant computer system(s) or
network(s), the storage and retrieval of ESI, and the backup, archiving, retention, and
routine destruction of ESI, together with pertinent contact information and a brief
description of each person's responsibilities;
(2) a list of the most likely custodian(s), other than the party, of relevant electronic
data, together with pertinent contact information, a brief description of each
custodian's responsibilities, and a description of the ESI in each custodian's
possession, custody or control;
(3) a list of each electronic system that may contain relevant ESI and each potentially
relevant electronic system that was operating during the time periods relevant to the
matters in dispute, together with a general description of each system;
(4) an indication of whether relevant ESI may be of limited accessibility or duration of
existence (e.g., because they are stored on media, systems, or formats no longer in use,

because it is subject to destruction in the routine course of business, or because
retrieval may be very costly);
(5) a list of relevant ESI that has been stored off-site or off-system;
(6) a description of any efforts undertaken, to date, to preserve relevant ESI, including
any suspension of regular document destruction, removal of computer media with
relevant information from its operational environment and placing it in secure storage
for access during litigation, or the making of forensic image back-ups of such computer
media;
(7) the form of production preferred by the party; and
(8) notice of any known problems reasonably anticipated to arise in connection with
compliance with e-discovery requests, including any limitations on search efforts
considered to be burdensome or oppressive or unreasonably expensive, the need for
any shifting or allocation of costs, the identification of potentially relevant data that is
likely to be destroyed or altered in the normal course of operations or pursuant to the
party's document retention policy.
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eight items require counsel to do her homework in connection with her
client's ESI. 6

Guideline 4 is the next step once the information set forth in
62
Guideline 3 has been exchanged, whether by agreement or by court order.
At this stage, the court should address specific disputes about the logistics
of electronic discovery issues.63 Among those issues are the allocation of
costs, information which is not readily accessible, the form of production,
the preservation of information, and inadvertent production of privileged
documents. 64
Guideline 5 concerns the factors to be considered in deciding a
motion for protective order or motion to compel discovery of ESI.65 The
first step is for the Court to determine whether the material is subject to
production under the applicable standard for discovery.66 Once the court
determines that the material is subject to production, Guideline 5 lists each
of the considerations the court should weigh to determine whether it should
enter an order for production. 67 This non-exhaustive list of factors includes
the relative resources of each party, each party's ability to control costs and
its incentive to do so, whether the requesting party has offered to pay some
or all of the costs, whether there is any history of deletion of ESI after the
party learned litigation was probable, the materiality of the information,
and the complexity of the case.68
Guideline 6 leaves the form of production in the hands of the court
in the absence of agreement between the parties. 69 That form of production
is limited to one format and generally is "the form of production in which
the information is ordinarily maintained or in a form that is reasonably
usable. ''7" The Comment discusses the pros and cons of producing in
"native format," that is, production in the form exactly as the information

61

Id. at 2-3.

62 Id. at 4-5.
63

Id. at 1.

64 Id. at 4-5.
65 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 5-6.

66 See Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. David Hewes, No. 06-1995, 2008 Mass. Super. LEXIS
350 (Worcester Superior Court, Oct. 7, 2008) (Agnes, J.). The court denied a motion to compel
where plaintiffs brief was "vague as to the focus of its electronic discovery requests" and "shed
little light" on their "particular relevance;" holding plaintiff must present convincing argument
that "computers may contain relevant information that cannot be obtained by less intrusive
means." Id.
67 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 5-6.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 6-7.
70 Id.
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may be found on the producing party's computer.7' It leaves open,
however, the question of whether metadata are discoverable based on the
particular circumstances of each case. The clear trend, however, seems to
be for production in native format with metadatai'
Guideline 7 contains a comprehensive discussion of the allocation
of discovery costs. 73 The presumption that the responding party must bear

the costs associated with production no longer applies under the
Guidelines. Utilizing the three-tiered cost-shifting principles set forth in
Zubulake 111,74 the Guideline "anticipates that the proposed cost/benefit
analysis will both encourage requesting parties to carefully assess whether
all the information sought is worth paying for, while discouraging the
producing party from storing the information in such a way as to make it
extraordinarily costly to retrieve. 75 In addition to the Guideline, there is
no shortage of case law that either party may cite as authority to support of
its efforts to shift the costs to the other party.76
Guideline 8 specifically codifies the clawback provisions contained
in many stipulated protective orders. 77 In fact, this Guideline only applies

71 Id.

72 See e.g., Goodbys Creek LLC v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 3:07-cv-947-J-34HTS, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79660, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2008) (ordering defendants to re-produce documents in
their native format); Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. May 4,
2007) (stating party can request production of ESI in its native format under Rule 34(b)); Nova
Measuring Instruments Ltd. v. Nanometrics, Inc., 417 F.Supp.2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting
motion to compel ESI produced in native format with original metadata); Hagenbuch v. 3B6
Sistemi Elettronici Industriali S.R.L., No. 04 C 3209, 2006 WL 665005 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006)
(parties have obligation under Rule 34 to produce digital materials in native format to ensure
production of relevant metadata).
73 VAN DUiZEND, supra note 35, at 7-8.
74 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Comment also provides a nice
synopsis of the case, which it calls the "leading federal case on the issue," and highlights the
relevant holding for those not familiar with it. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 7-8.
75 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 7-8. Cf Williams v. Taser Int'l, No. 1:06-CV-0051RWS, 2007 WL 1630875, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Ga. June 4, 2007) (holding company must "make all
reasonable efforts . . . including . . . retaining additional IT professionals to search electronic

").
databases and adding additional attorneys ....
76 See, e.g., Zubulake II, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (cost shifting appropriate only
when inaccessible data requested); Xpedior Credit Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA),
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating reasons why no justification for Defendant to
shift costs to plaintiff); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Gary Karlin Michelson, M.D., 229
F.R.D. 550 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (holding defendant should bear costs of proposed discovery given
volume of discovery requested); Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D.
421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding cost shifting appropriate, excluding cost of screening for relevance
and privilege); Murphy Oil USA v. Daniel, No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439 (E.D. La.
2002) (giving defendant options for proceeding with discovery of e-mail, including bearing
costs).
77 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 8-9.
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78
in the absence of an agreement regarding inadvertent disclosure of ESI.
The Guideline also provides a list of factors to determine whether a party
has waived the attorney-client privilege as a result of an inadvertent
disclosure. 79 Factors that bear on the issue of waiver include the volume of
information produced, the amount of privileged information disclosed, the
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent such inadvertent
disclosure, and the promptness of the actions taken to remedy the error. 8 °
The Comment cautions, however, that such clawback provisions "are not
perfect protections against the use of privileged information by third parties
not subject to the agreement or by the receiving party in another
jurisdiction." 81
Guideline 9 appears to be aimed at foreclosing the rush to the
courthouse for a preservation order every time a case arises in which ESI
will be involved. 82 The Guideline suggests that a judge should require a
"threshold showing that the continuing existence and integrity of the
information is threatened" before entering such an order. 83 Upon such a
showing, the Guidelines include a list of factors to consider in determining
the nature and scope of the order, cautioning that any such order should be
carefully tailored so 84as not to be broader than necessary to safeguard the
information at issue.
Guideline 10 addresses the issue of imposition of sanctions.8 5
Perhaps the most interesting implication from this Guideline is its departure
from the general Massachusetts jurisprudence with respect to spoliation. 6
Guideline 10 does not specifically require a showing of prejudice to the
non-spoliating party for sanctions to be imposed.8
The Guidelines also contain a comprehensive bibliography for the
practitioner to utilize in connection with e-discovery issues. 88 That
bibliography includes reference to the Sedona Principles which were
compiled at the Sedona Conference Working Group on Best Practices for
Electronic Retention and Production, which is seen by many courts as

78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 VAN DUIZEND, supranote 35, at 9-10.
83 Id.
84 Id.

" Id. at 10- 11.
86

id.

87 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 10-11.
88

Id. at 13-14.
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providing invaluable guidance in the area of e-discovery. 9 Among the
other notable citations in the bibliography are the state rules of civil
procedure for the states of90Texas and Mississippi, which include specific
rules targeting e-discovery.
C.

Differences Between The Guidelines and The FederalRules

By their terms, the Guidelines "should be considered along with
the other resources cited in the attached bibliography including the newly
revised provisions on discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the most recent edition of the American Bar Association Standards
Relating to Discovery." 9' There are a few significant differences that
should not be overlooked.92 First and foremost, the federal rules have the
advantage of being able to simply include discussions of electronic
discovery into the existing Rule 26 conference framework, a framework
which requires an early conference between counsel and early voluntary
"automatic" disclosure of relevant information.93 The issue of electronic
discovery then is simply added to the agenda of topics to be discussed at
these early Rule 26 conferences.94 In contrast, the state court, with the
exception of the Business Litigation Session which holds Rule 16
conferences for early discussion of cases, does not have an established
practice calling for an early meeting of counsel and followed by
"voluntary" pre-discovery disclosures. 95 The Guidelines, specifically
Guideline 3, put this early discovery conference 96into place, thus making the
e-discovery issues the only items on the agenda.
With respect to the format of production, both the Federal Rules
and the Guidelines agree that ESI need be produced in just one format;
where they disagree, however, is on how to determine the appropriate
format for production of ESI. The Federal Rules give the requesting party
the power to request the format preferred, while the Guidelines provide that
the court "should select the form of production in which the information is

9 See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("In addition, professional groups
such as the American Bar Association and the Sedona Conference have provided very useful
guidance on thorny issues relating to the discovery of electronically stored infornation.").
90 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 13-14.
Id. at vii.
92 Id.
"'

93 FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
94 FED. R. Civ. P. 26.

5 C MASS. R. Civ. P. 26, et seq.
96 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 2-3.
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ordinarily maintained or in a form that is reasonably usable. 9 7 Moreover,
Guideline 3(B)(7) simply states that the form of production "preferred" by
the requesting party is just one factor a court should consider when
deciding what method of production to order. 98
Under the Federal Rules, if the discovery requests do not provide
for the format, there is a default provision under Rule 34(b)(ii) which
provides that the information be produced either in the form in which it is
maintained and used in the ordinary course of business or in some other
"reasonably usable" form. 99 Guideline 6, on the other hand, does not
contain such a default provision if the discovery request is silent on the
issue. 100
The Federal Rules and the Guidelines also approach the production
of metadata differently. The Federal Rules do not speak to the issue of
metadata directly, and the comments simply indicate that the issue of
production of metadata is a topic that should be raised and discussed early
between counsel for the parties.' 0 ' Notably different, the Guidelines
include metadata in the definition of "ESI" and indicate that there is no
02
rebuttable presumption against its production. 1
The Guidelines also contain a safe harbor provision that is not
present in the federal rules. Guideline 5 suggests that the trial court
consider whether the responding party deleted information "after litigation
was commenced or after the responding party was aware that litigation was
probable."' 10 3 This provision is far more forgiving than the federal
jurisprudence which suggests that the duty to preserve is triggered by the
04
mere "possibility" of litigation. 1
D.

Spoliation

Sanctions for spoliation of evidence is by no means a novel
concept. Courts derive the power to sanction for spoliation from the their
inherent power to manage cases, often invoking Rule 37(b)(2) of the

97 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b), with VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 6-7.
98 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 3.

99 See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(ii). This rule requires that ESI be produced either in the form in
which it is maintained and used in the ordinary course of business or in some other "reasonably
usable" form if requesting party does not specify format. Id.
100 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 6-7.
101 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) Advisory Committee Comments.
102 VAN DUIZEND, supra note 35, at 1.
3 Id. at 5-6.
104 Optowave Co., Ltd. v. Nikitin, No. 6:05-cv-1083-Orl-22DAB, 2006 WL 3231422 (M.D.

Fla. Nov. 2006); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure which sets forth a variety of
sanctions that may be entered against a party who fails to comply with a
court's discovery order.' 0 5 Spoliation of electronic evidence, however, can
have monumental consequences, as is evident from two recent decisions in
which courts issued adverse inference instructions that led to multimillion
dollar verdicts. 0 6 Spoliation of electronic evidence also implicates ethical
rules.107

With the Guidelines as a benchmark for e-discovery practice and
compliance, issues regarding spoliation of ESI may arise more often than in
the past. The only reported Massachusetts state court case addressing
spoliation sanctions for the destruction of electronic evidence is Linnen v.
A.H. Robins Co.,' 08 in which the court ordered the party to preserve the
documents but the defendant failed to stop the process of recycling backup
tapes.' 9 The sanction imposed in that case was a spoliation inference
provided to the jury.' " In Massachusetts, it is likely that the federal court
decisions will be of persuasive value because the Guidelines in many
respects mirror the Federal Rules even though they have not yet been
codified.'"
The bedrock Massachusetts spoliation cases, however, are still the
general standard for all spoliation issues.'' 2 The elements of spoliation in
105 MASS. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Sanctions include delaying discovery or trial; requiring the
offending party to pay the costs and fees incurred by the requesting party related to the offending
conduct; refusing to allow the offending party to adduce certain facts or put on certain witnesses
related to the offending conduct; treating matters or facts related to the offending conduct as
admitted for purposes of the action; declaring a mistrial; striking pleadings; or entering a default
judgment against, or dismissing the claims of the offending party. Id.
106 See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1,2005) (awarding $1.4 billion
verdict to plaintiff); Zubolake V, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (awarding plaintiff $29
million).
107See MASS. R. PROF. C. 3.4(a) and cmt. 2 (a lawyer shall not "unlawfully alter, destroy, or
conceal a document or other material thing having potential evidentiary value.").
108 No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 6, 1999).
1 9 Id. at *1-*2.
see also Babaev v. Grossman. No. CV03-5076, 2008 WL 4185703, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
110Id.;
Sept. 8, 2008) (granting adverse inference where computer containing information about
defendants' financial situation destroyed).
111 The Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law
produced a preliminary draft of the existing law for public comment in August of 2007.
112 See e.g.. Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc., 786 N.E.2d 824, 833 (Mass. 2003)
(spoliation of hospital records where there is a duty to preserve warranted finding of spoliation);
Kippenhan v. Chaulk Servs., Inc., 697 N.E.2d 527, 531 (Mass. 1998) (plaintiffs allowed to
introduce testimony of the condition of an allegedly defective stretcher, even though the stretcher
had been lost, because plaintiffs "did not cause [its] loss or disappearance, and therefore, were not
at fault in its loss."); Bolton v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 593 N.E.2d 248, 249-50
(Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (finding spoliation where the defendant destroyed an allegedly defective
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Massachusetts are that: 1) a party to the litigation intentionally or
negligently destroyed evidence; 2) that party was aware that there was a
potential for litigation and that the evidence was material to the litigation;
and 3) the loss or destruction of the evidence created prejudice to the other
party.

113

As to the first element, spoliation requires destruction by a party, or
an agent it truly controls, in circumstances where they knew or should have
known that relevant evidence was being destroyed because "[s]poliation
does not include a fault-free destruction or loss of physical evidence."' 14
As the Supreme Judicial Court has observed: "We are aware of no
jurisdiction that has suppressed a party's evidence or drawn an adverse
inference against a party where neither that party nor anyone acting on
behalf of that party was the spoliator."" 5
In Fletcher v. Dorchester Mutual Insurance Company,116 the SJC
addressed the second element, i.e., "whether, and in what circumstances, a
duty to preserve evidence arises."'1 17 In analyzing the issue, the court
started with the precept that "[p]ersons who are not themselves parties 1to
the litigation do not have a duty to preserve evidence for use by others." 18
The reasoning of Fletcher finds its support in numerous other decisions
regarding spoliation of evidence, all of which require, as a prerequisite to
applying spoliation sanctions, that the destruction of evidence was at the
hands of a party or agent thereof with knowledge of the likelihood of
litigation and the relevance of the documents. 119 The likelihood of
litigation is easier to predict in a tort case where there was an accident
underlying the claim, thereby making the likelihood of litigation

bus after defendant's expert had inspected it); Nally v. Volkswagen of America, 539 N.E.2d
1017, 1021 (Mass. 1989) (finding spoliation where the plaintiffs accident reconstruction expert
had destroyed and/or misplaced parts of the allegedly defective car that killed plaintiffs
decedent).
113See Nally, 539 N.E.2d at 1028.
114 Kippenhan, 697 N.E.2d at 530. "Accidental destruction of evidence does not warrant
spoliation remedies." Jean, et al. v. Waban, Inc., et al., No. C96-00694, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS
184, at *7 n.7 (Mass. Super. Ct. February 24, 1999).
115Kippenhan, 697 N.E.2d at 531.
116 773 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Mass. 2002).
117 Id.
118 Id.

119See Keene, 786 N.E.2d at 832 ("[t]he doctrine of spoliation is based on the premise that a
party who has negligently or intentionally lost or destroyed evidence known to be relevant should
be held accountable for any unfair prejudice that results.") (emphasis added). See also
Kippenhan, 697 N.E.2d at 530 (acknowledging that spoliation sanctions may be assessed for prelitigation conduct, but only "if a litigant or his expert knows or reasonably should know that the
evidence might be relevant to a possible action.").

NA VIGA TING E-DISCO VER Y

2009]

obvious.' 20 This issue is tougher in business cases. Even in this "litigious
society," there may be little about the basic fact pattern of the case which

"trumpet[s], or even whisper[s] lawsuit" to a defendant in a business
case.

121

As for the third element, it is clear that the doctrine of spoliation is
"based on the premise that a party who has negligently or intentionally lost
or destroyed evidence known to be relevant for an upcoming legal

proceeding should be held accountable for any unfair prejudice that
results.,

122

Once there is spoliation, "the judge has the discretion to craft a

123
remedy addressing 'the precise un-fairness that would otherwise result.""

Generally, "a judge should impose the least severe sanction necessary to
remedy the prejudice to the nonspoliating party. 124

Unfair prejudice flows, for example, from a spoliator placing itself
in the position of having the only "first hand knowledge" of critical
evidence, or from the spoliator's destruction of its opponent's "most
persuasive" evidence.1 25 For that reason, a spoliation "sanction should be
narrowly addressed to the precise unfairness that would otherwise
result.' 26 Having found that the elements of spoliation are present, the
court can choose from a variety of remedies. The remedy chosen may
the jury on the adverse inferences that may be drawn
include instructing
27
from spoliation.1
Adverse inference instructions, however, are not the only sanctions
28
available for conduct which amounts to spoliation of material evidence.
Default and dismissal are harsh but realistic possibilities, though these

sanctions are generally reserved for egregious conduct that results in
extreme prejudice to the requesting party.' 29 In at least two reported e-

120 See Gath v. M/A Corn, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 521 (Mass. 2003) (action for damages arising out

of injury from gate which flung open and hit plaintiff); Keene, 786 N.E.2d at 832 (medical
malpractice case involving brain damage to infant).
121 See McCarthy v. Van Aarle, et al., No. 0201959, 2004 WL 1932666, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. July 19, 2004) (Brady, J.).
122 Westover v. Leiserv, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 400, 404 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
123 Id. (quoting Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 426 (Mass. 2002)).
124 Id. at 404 (quoting Keene, 786 N.E.2d at 833) (internal quotations omitted).
125 See Nally v. Volkswagen of America, 539 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Mass. 1989).
126 Id.; see also Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 426 ("sanctions for spoliation are carefully tailored
to remedy the precise unfairness occasioned by that spoliation").
127 See Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 521, 527 (Mass. 2003).
128 See Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 267 (D. Md. 2008) (holding
defense counsel would suffer waiver of privilege because review for privilege conducted not
reasonable).
129 See Rice v. City of Chicago, 333 F.3d 780, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[It is well settled in
this circuit that the ultimate sanction of dismissal should be invoked only in extreme situations
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discovery decisions, not even a party's use of software to delete files

subsequent to the commencement of litigation was sufficient to generate a
sanction of dismissal. 130

E-discovery abuses, even when they are

intentional, may not result in sanctions where the requesting party cannot
prove prejudice.' 31 Likewise, courts generally reject sanctions in instances
where there is little evidence of bad faith and no prejudice to the requesting
party. 132 So long as the court can return the non-spoliating133party to the

status quo ante, these extreme sanctions are rarely warranted.
E-discovery case law also demonstrates that courts focus attention
on the actions and obligations of counsel, but sanctions are not reserved for
the lead trial counsel.

A California case, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom,

1 34

Corp.,
demonstrates that the court's expectations for attorney ediscovery expertise extend even to the most junior attorneys. 131 In that
case, the court refused to excuse a junior associate from mistakes he made
in conducting e-discovery because if he lacked experience or competency
136
in this area, a senior attorney should have been supervising the associate.
With respect to the senior attorney's claims that he did not review the
when there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, or when other less drastic
sanctions have proven unreliable.").
130 See Anderson v. Crossroads Capital Partners, LLC, No. 01-2000 ADM/SRW, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1867, at *25 (D. Minn. Feb. 10, 2004) (where plaintiff used data purging software
application after agreeing not to delete any existing files, court found that plaintiffs "exceedingly
tedious and disingenuous claim of naivete" defied the "founds of reason," but was sufficient only
to warrant adverse inference not dismissal.); Kucala Enters. Ltd. v. Auto Wax Co., No. 02 C
1403, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19103, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003) (ordering that plaintiff
bear expenses flowing from misconduct where plaintiff used "Evidence Eliminator" software to
delete files the night before a scheduled discovery inspection, but rejecting recommendation that
claims be dismissed with prejudice).
131 See Wong v. Thomas, No. 05-2588 (AET) 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71246, at *10 (D. N.J.
Sept. 9, 2008) (refusing to grant sanctions for spoliation because plaintiff unable to specify kind
of evidence destroyed and its relevance); but cf Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 430-31 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (discussion of standard for adverse inference); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin.
Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) ("The inference is adverse to the destroyer not because of
any finding of moral culpability but because the risk that the evidence would have been
detrimental rather than favorable should fall on the party responsible for the loss.").
132 N.Y. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Cuomo, No. 93 Civ. 7146(RLC)VCF, 1998 WL 395320, at
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (sanctions not appropriate because little evidence of bad faith and
plaintiffs not prejudiced).
133 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 437 (stating that "major consideration in choosing appropriate
sanction ... is to restore Zubulake to the position that she would have been in had UBS faithfully
discharged its discovery obligations"); GTFM, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7724
RPP, 2000 WL 335558, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (holding discovery sanctions "ensure that
a party will not benefit from its own failure to comply" and act as deterrent).
134 No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated in part and
remandedin part, No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (Mar. 5,2008).
135 Qualcomm, 2008 WL 66932, at *14.
136

. ,
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3
work, the court held that such a claim amounted to willful ignorance.' '
The Qualcomm case echoes the expectations of counsel laid out in the
Zubulake decisions, namely, that attorneys must not only be familiar with
their client's policies, but they also must be conversant in the technological38
structure of their client's systems, as well as their client's actual practice.'
In this way, the onus to provide comprehensive e-discovery falls on the
attorney, not on the client.
Sanctions are also not reserved for the producing party. In Theofel
v. Jones, 139 the Ninth Circuit sanctioned a party for serving an overbroad email subpoena on a third party internet service provider. 140 These types of
cases put the burden squarely on the requesting party to narrowly tailor
discovery requests so as not to unduly burden the responding party.
These cases underscore the importance of working with clients in
advance of litigation to come up with a model and strategy for dealing with
electronic discovery-a strategy that will save money in the long run
because the lessons learned will be transferable to subsequent litigation
down the road. Even after litigation commences, developing case law
highlights that the existence of a "litigation hold" to preserve relevant
information does not insulate the attorney from sanctions. Some courts
have gone a step further to require that the responding party establish that
the litigation hold was effective in practice. 141
The easiest way for counsel to avoid sanctions and at the same time
get the information you are seeking is to remember these simple maxims:
1. Open an early dialogue with opposing counsel on ESI issues
because it will be cheaper for your client;
2. Ensure that every member of your team is conversant in and
familiar with the information systems of your client and on e-discovery in
general.
3. Do not assume familiarity with e-discovery on the part of the
court or your adversary.
4. Be prepared in the first instance to articulate whether and why
the facts of the case merit the production of electronic documents;
particularly in the face of what are likely steep costs (the amount of which
you should also have at your fingertips) and in many instances, the
sensitive nature of the information.

137 Id. at *15.

Id. at *9.
139 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
141 Id. at 987.
141 See United Medical Supply v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 274 (2007) (holding
13'

government must ensure litigation hold received by employees and was effective in practice).
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5. Take the time to educate others involved, a task which obviously
requires that you are educated yourself. For example, if you intend to
argue that the requested ESI would harm or disrupt your client's computer
services, be prepared to support your argument with some type of expert
testimony.
6. Be prepared to argue for cost-shifting, even if you are the
responding party. The easiest way to make your case is to be prepared,
informed, and flexible and have at least one fallback position.
7. Work with your clients in advance of litigation to come up with
a model and strategy for dealing with electronic discovery. You will save
money in the long run because what you learn will be transferable to
subsequent litigation down the road.
8. Do not assume that your litigation hold has been properly
implemented. Follow up with your client to ensure that the procedures you
put in place are actually implemented by your client.
9. Set yourself a Shepard's alert for any and all new cases
involving interpretation of amendments to the Federal Rules so that you
will be up to date on the latest developments.
10. Make sure that your client's document retention policy is
consistent with the Guidelines and with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
III. CONCLUSION
Until the Supreme Judicial Court adopts its own e-discovery
amendments or simply adopts the Uniform Rules Relating to the Discovery
of Electronically Stored Information, 142 the Guidelines are the most
authoritative reference. They provide much needed authority that is
currently missing from the case law- authority which will support the
positions taken by counsel in connection with efforts to obtain e-discovery

142 The Uniform Rules Relating to the Discovery of Electronically-Stored Information were
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
in August of 2007. The NCCUSL is perhaps best known for promulgating the Uniform
Commercial Code. The Uniform Rules are also linked to the Massachusetts Trial Court website.
The Uniform Rules by their terms "mirror the spirit and direction" of the 2006 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, modifying them only "where necessary to accommodate the
varying state procedures." The Uniform Rules provide much more detail on the options to a court
and the appropriate decision-making criteria than do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
NCCUSL, UNIFORM RULES RELATING TO THE DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED

INFORMATION 2 (2007), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/udoera/2007_final.pdf. The
Uniform Rules, however, are only applicable to a case if the parties agree or if the court orders
that they be applied. Id.
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or to prevent its abuse. 143 The Guidelines, along with the existing federal
jurisprudence in this hot and continuously-developing area of the law, are
powerful weapons in the practitioner's arsenal. This is particularly true if
the practitioner is well-versed in the client's informational technology
systems and has done his or her homework in advance of litigation, as
opposed to a post-complaint catch-up. Well armed with these Guidelines,
and well versed in the client's IT systems, a practitioner can have
confidence in her navigation of these potentially treacherous waters.

143 This is not to say that practitioners cannot rely on federal jurisprudence in this area. It is
well-settled that the trial courts of the Commonwealth may employ the cognate federal
interpretation of the rules of civil procedure in the absence of state court jurisprudence on the
issues. See Rollins Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 330 N.E.2d 814 (Mass. 1975).

